

GREAT EXPEDITIONS: LIVY ON THUCYDIDES

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However much historical coincidences put one in mind of Thucydides 1.22.4, historical reality reveals that human nature alone cannot guarantee identical results in similar situations, even when human beings react in similar ways to a given opportunity. But since historians are not remarkably different from the rest of mankind, only an obtuse or perverse literary personality would neglect the chance, given an opportunity, to draw a parallel. The passion for things Attic which infected various Romans in the second half of the first century B.C., combined, perhaps, with the political situation, created an environment in which Thucydidean coloring of historical works became not only possible but likely.¹ Cicero, in the midst of his lament that orators have gone too far in their search for "Attic" models, rejects Thucydides as a suitable subject for an orator to imitate, while he allows that historians could do worse than to consult the great Athenian (*Brutus* 278).² There were not only Romans but Greeks: the unsuccessful, Dionysius refused to name.³ Demosthenes, intelligently under the influence, was another case (*de Thuc.* 53ff.; *de Dem.* 10). Of the Roman writers of the second half of the first century, Sallust in particular found in Thucydides a congenial influence, and won a reputation as a successful imitator of not only Thucydidean style but "ethos" as well. No one can have failed to notice, for example, that Sallust created for Caesar and Cato argumentative modes which Diodotus and Cleon employed in the Mytilenean debate, although in Sallust benevolent pragmatism did not win and the exordia of the speeches

¹ R. Syme, *Sallust* (Berkeley 1964) 52 remarks, "War and disturbance, however, bring men to Thucydides in different ages, for recognition, instruction, and grim comfort." On pp. 52-56 he reviews Thucydides' place in the "Atticist" controversy and in the development of Sallust's style (see also pp. 245-48). A. D. Leeman, *REL* 33 (1955) 193-205 (Atticisme et "thucydidisme"), is worth reading as well.

² Dionysius, *de Thuc.* 55 *fin.* distinguishes between the narrative (worthy) and speeches (unworthy of imitation).

³ *De Thuc.* 52; cf. the comparison of Philistus in *Ep. ad Pomp.* 5, *de imit.* 3.2. Cicero mentions Philistus and Thucydides in the same breath (*Brutus* 66) with Cato; cf. *Ep. ad Q.F.* 2.12.4, *de Orat.* 2.57.

come from Demosthenes.⁴ But questions of characterization aside, Sallust has consulted Thucydides, if only for the means to express what kind of argument is needed to sway a particular audience.⁵

Livy himself, the most Ciceronian of historians, was neither ignorant of Thucydides nor immune from the temptation to draw parallels. He opens the account of the second Punic war with a direct echo of Thucydides' assertion of the importance of his subject, complete down to the larger reasons given in support of the claim, but differing in particulars and in the background material.⁶ Other passages, too, in Books 21–30 point to Thucydides' influence. There is the account of the plague at Syracuse (25.26.7ff.), some of which is borrowed from Thucydides 2.47ff.⁷ There are several characterizations which remind the reader of personalities described in the history of the Peloponnesian war: Cleon is so memorable that he can serve as model for Metilius (Livy 22.25.3ff., Thuc. 4.27.4–5), Varro (22.25.18–26.4, Thuc. 3.36.6 and 4.21.3), and Minucius (Livy 22.27.1–4, Thuc. 5.7.3), all adversaries of Fabius, a Nicias-figure in some respects,⁸ although Nicias has another side represented by Paullus (22.40.3, Thuc. 7.48.4), and Fabius himself has something in common with Pericles (22.23.4, Thuc. 2.13.1). There are descriptive details which are perhaps too commonplace to deserve note.⁹ Cities,

⁴ Caesar's from 8.1 (*On the Chersonese*) and Cato's from 3.1 (*Third Olynthiac*). Cf. Syme (above, note 1) 244 with note 23.

⁵ Syme (above, note 1) 56 notes that Sallust uses Thucydides not only stylistically but "to produce an equivalence of manner and atmosphere." T. F. Scanlon, *The Influence of Thucydides on Sallust* (Heidelberg 1980) has collected and analyzed the numerous passages in Sallust's works which owe something to Thucydides. He also gives an annotated bibliography of the topic in his introduction. See pp. 102–8 for likenesses and differences in the Mytilenean and Catilinarian debates.

⁶ Both state that their topic is most worthy of remembrance; in fact, allowing for the difference in idiom, Livy's opening words (from *bellum maxime* . . .) translate Thucydides'. Each observes immediately that the two parties involved were at the height of their power. Livy omits Thucydides' "worldwide" implications and traces the origins of the second Punic war to the end of the first and the personalities of Hannibal and Hamilcar, with a nod to Thucydides' excursus into ancient history (1.1.2ff.) in the words *neque validiores opibus ullae inter se civitates gentesque contulerunt arma* (21.1.2).

⁷ E.g., the danger of contact and resultant neglect of the ill (Livy 25.26.8; Thuc. 2.47.4, 2.51.5), the eventual lack of mourning and proper burial (Livy 25.26.10; Thuc. 2.51.2, 2.51.5 fin.). Admittedly, the subject became popular, and it was elsewhere better, and recently, imitated (Lucretius 6.1138–1286; Virgil, *Georgics* 3.478–566).

⁸ Cleon berates Nicias for the generals' failure to resolve the situation at Pylos, just as Fabius is rebuked for his failure to meet and defeat Hannibal. P. G. Walsh, *Livy. His Historical Aims and Methods* (Cambridge 1961) 105 observes that Fabius resembles Nicias when Minucius resembles Cleon ("one can perhaps discern the indirect influence of Thucydides"). Fabius appears to be beset by not one but three Cleons.

⁹ I cite two: the nighttime escape from Acerrae (23.17.5–6) is similar to the flight from Plataea (Thuc. 3.22–24); Marcellus at Nola (23.16.10ff.) uses the tactics of Brasidas at Amphipolis (Thuc. 5.7–8, 10).

peoples, and armies may be described in a manner now familiar; there is moral decay at Rome (24.18.2) and civil sickness at Syracuse (24.29.3; cf. Thuc. 3.82.2, 83.1); the various motives of the different ethnic components of Hannibal's troops at Zama bring to mind Thucydides' catalogue of men and motives before the great battle in the harbor at Syracuse (30.33.8ff.; Thuc. 7.57). Rome after Cannae is like Athens after the Sicilian expedition, yet different (22.54.7–55.3, Thuc. 8.1.1–3).¹⁰

Out of all the Peloponnesian war, it is the personalities and events of the Sicilian Expedition which find their reflection in Livy's narrative of the second Punic war.¹¹ Livy has Marcellus pause before Syracuse and reflect upon several incidents in that city's history. The Athenian attack receives twice as much coverage as all the struggles with Carthage (25.24.11–12). The Athenians' temerity was matched by Scipio's, and the invasion of Africa was history's challenge to Livy's ability to notice and compare. In both cases, a young man wanted to go and an old man thought the endeavor unwise; each argued his case; the people were generally favorable to the more adventurous course; and, although a scandal involving a chthonic deity threw an ominous religious cloud over the preparations, the armada sailed off after a glorious farewell. There are differences, slight in particulars, enormous in the event. Nicias went with the Athenian expedition, and Alcibiades, frustrated in his request for a trial, was assailed after his departure by political enemies who secured his recall, condemnation in absentia, and (as Thucydides has it) the failure of the expedition. Fabius did not go to Sicily or to Africa with Scipio; he remained in Rome where, human nature being what it is, he tried to have Scipio recalled because of what had happened at Locri.¹² But at Rome moderation (and its spokesman Q. Metellus) prevailed over faction: Scipio was exonerated after investigation, sailed to Africa with a clear slate, and won the war.

¹⁰ In both cases there is mourning, and despair at the great loss and the lack of human resources for replacements, as well as a conviction that the enemy will soon arrive to attack the city, and a determination not to give in. Allies desert as well (Livy 22.61.10–12; Thucydides 8.2.1–2). But Livy has nothing to parallel Thucydides' observations about the people's anger against political figures and soothsayers, nor the remark that fear will always make the people behave properly. On the contrary, the Romans thanked Varro, the principal author of the catastrophe, *quod de re publica non desperasset* (22.61.14).

¹¹ Note the several citations from Book 7 (8.1 included) above, and Marcellus' musings at Syracuse, cited below. The invasion of Sicily in Books 6–7 of Thucydides stands as a narrative in its own right, apart from the larger history, just as the second Punic war is an account complete in itself.

¹² Plutarch preserves more information about Fabius' continued opposition, hostility, and rivalry, which shows him in a less kindly light than Livy, and has Cato join him: *Fabius* 25.2–26.5, *Cato Maior* 3.4–8. See W. Hoffmann, *Livius und der zweite punische Krieg*, Hermes Einzelschrift 8 (1942) 91–93 for discussion of Plutarch and Livy's kinder treatment of Fabius.

Remarkable coincidences, until the end. There is no way to tell which of Livy's sources may have made something of them, but Livy surely has, whether his inspiration came from Thucydides himself or through an intermediary.¹³ There are hints in the treatment of the scandal after Pleminius' misconduct at Locri and in the description of the departure of the fleet,¹⁴ and Livy reveals the parallel when he has Fabius liken Scipio to another Alcibiades bringing ruin on his state with his rash venture (28.41.17: he includes a direct reference to the great battle in the harbor); Scipio is unable to ignore the comparison but turns it aside (28.43.20). The best evidence for Thucydidean influence on Livy lies in the two orations delivered by Fabius and Scipio in the senate in 205. In Thucydides, Nicias delivers two speeches which frame Alcibiades' argument, probably because Nicias actually spoke twice. Livy, however, gives a balanced pair,¹⁵ and Fabius' speech includes elements

¹³ For this part of Book 28 (the proceedings in the senate), Valerius Antias is a prime candidate in the literature (H. Hesselbarth, *Historisch-kritische Untersuchungen zur dritten Dekade des Livius* [Halle 1889] 559; W. Soltau, *Livius' Quellen in der III. Dekade* [Berlin 1894] 40, although he does not exclude the likelihood that Livy has made his own contributions to the speeches of Scipio and Fabius; R. Ullmann, *La Technique des discours dans Saluste, Tite Live et Tacite* [Oslo 1927] 118; A. Klotz, *RhM* 84 [1935] 151, *Livius und seine Vorgänger* [Leipzig and Berlin 1940] 190), but Polybius has support as well (G. Stübler, *Die Religiosität des Livius* [Stuttgart-Berlin 1941] 161–62). For the speech of the Locrians and its effect (29.16.4–22.12), Soltau (44, 48–49, 53) believes that Valerius is the source as well, although Livy has written the actual speech and based it upon Coelius and some Greek source, and Klotz (192, 194) believes that it is Coelius Antipater, but Ullmann (124) and Hesselbarth (571) think that it is someone better (not, however, Polybius or Coelius). H. Tränkle, *Livius und Polybios* (Basel 1977) discusses in his third chapter the possibility that Livy used Polybius as a source in the third decade. A comparison of passages leads him to the conclusion that Polybius is unlikely to be a direct source: see, e.g., pp. 205, 222, 227. It is regrettable that there is no portion of Polybius extant for comparison of the passages at issue here. Ullmann 124 notes: "Pour le discours [of the Locrians] nous croyons que Tite Live l'a élaboré très librement lui-même." If Livy's source already displayed Thucydidean coloring, I would guess that Livy, like any other educated person, would have recognized the allusion and refreshed his memory by rereading the text of Thucydides. It is equally possible that Livy has independently consulted the fifth-century historian. The result, whatever the process, is that Livy has accepted the analogy with the Sicilian Expedition. T. J. Luce, *Livy. The Composition of His History* (Princeton 1977) 139–84 has argued well and at length for allowing Livy education, intelligence, powers of reasoning and judgment, and his own viewpoint.

¹⁴ Klotz (above, note 13) 193: "Die Fortsetzung, die von dem nun wirklich erfolgreichen Übergang Scipios nach Afrika berichtet (24,7–27,15), hat einheitlichen Charakter." He believes that Livy used at least three Roman sources (Coelius, Valerius Antias, Claudius Quadrigarius) and Polybius. E. Burck, *Einführung in die dritte Dekade des Livius* (Heidelberg 1950) 144, note 51 observes that Thucydides 6.31–32 is in the background. See below, section III.

¹⁵ The third decade has three pairs of opposing orations in *oratio recta*: 22.59–60 (the leader of the Roman captives and Torquatus' reply), 28.40–44 (Fabius and Scipio), 30.30–31 (Hannibal and Scipio [which also balances the speeches of Scipio *père* and Hannibal at 21.40–41, 43–44]).

from both of Nicias'. The following synopses will illustrate that, with allowance made for the occasional intrusion of this synthesis, Livy has Fabius include, in almost exactly the same order, all of Nicias' arguments from his first speech; and Scipio's reply embraces, in almost exactly the same order, most of Alcibiades' answers.¹⁶

There is nothing novel about subjecting Livy's speeches to analysis into conventional literary partitions,¹⁷ and I follow such a scheme here. It is pleasant to note, incidentally, that the idiosyncratic Thucydides was well versed in the arrangement of topics when the technical study of oratory was still in its first generation, for these speeches offer themselves almost as readily as Livy's to a schematic breakdown along traditional lines of argument.¹⁸ The differences between Livy's speeches and Thucydides' are due to three obvious causes: 1) since more than two centuries had elapsed between the dramatic dates, Fabius and Scipio have at their disposal historical exempla unknown to fifth-century Athenians. 2) The reasons for the invasions and the exact circumstances differ: Alcibiades and others¹⁹ wished to expand the Athenians' sphere of influence when Attica was at peace and Alcibiades had already obtained a command which he wanted to retain, while Scipio aimed to turn a defensive war to the offensive and, given his consular colleague's position,²⁰ if an invasion were to take place Scipio would lead it. 3) Thucydides and his characters were Greek; Livy and his were Roman. Livy has taken a scene from the past, built it anew, and painted over it; in the process of creating his own version he has recalled Thucydides and demonstrated that men in history can deviate from past performances, especially when the situations and people in them are similar only in certain respects.²¹ As if to point the moral, Livy has Fabius warn Scipio, *quae acciderunt accidere possunt* (28.41.13). His prediction proved false.

¹⁶ Stübler (above, note 13) 152–53 believes that Scipio had a speech in Livy's source, but not Fabius, whose words are Livy's own idea. Later (157) he says, "Die Reden des Fabius und Scipio entsprechen bis ins einzelne denen des Nikias und Alkibiades vor dem Zug gegen Sizilien; die Ähnlichkeit der Situation ist ganz auffallend." In note 187 on that page he reports his hope of demonstrating the likeness at a future time.

¹⁷ See Ullmann (above, note 13) 118–21, and recently, A. D. Botha, *AClass* 23 (1980) 75–79. The arrangement here is somewhat different from Ullmann's.

¹⁸ For a detailed discussion of the stylistic elements of these speeches, see W. Kohl, *Die Redetrias vor der sizilischen Expedition (Thukydides 6,9–23)* (Meisenheim am Glan 1977). Beyond the immediate topic at issue here, but by no means to be missed, is the paper by H.-P. Stahl, "Speeches and Course of Events in Books Six and Seven of Thucydides," in P. A. Stadter ed., *The Speeches in Thucydides* (Chapel Hill 1973) 60–77.

¹⁹ Cf. Thucydides 6.1.1; Nicias' thought at 6.8.4.

²⁰ As Pontifex Maximus he should not leave Italy; Scipio mentions this factor at 28.44.11.

²¹ Stübler (above, note 13) 158–62 explains Livy's use of Thucydides somewhat differently.

In Thucydides the vote precedes the reported arguments, as in the Mytilenean debate; in Livy the senate's decision is reserved for the following day.²² The mandate in each case is limited, with the decision to expand the sphere of operations left to the commander(s): ὅπη ἂν γινώσκωσιν ἄριστα Ἀθηναίους (6.8.2) / *si id e re publica esse censeret* (28.45.8).

I. FABIUS AND NICIAS. Livy, Book 28; Thucydides, Book 6

A. Prooemium. (Principium a re et a nostra persona)

NICIAS

a. Although the people have decided upon the expedition, he believes that there is yet room for discussion, and a vote to reverse the decree to take on a war which is not fitting, after οὕτω βραχεία βουλῇ (9.1).

b. He has gained honor from war himself and is not a coward, although there is nothing wrong with prudence, which benefits the city (τὰ τῆς πόλεως . . . ὀρθοῦσθαι) (9.2).

c. He has never spoken against his true opinion for the sake of acclaim (9.2).

FABIUS

a. There has been no decision yet, although his listeners may assume that there is no reason to discuss what has been decided; the consul should not waste the senate's time if he intends to go to the people. He objects to *ista festinatio* (40.3–5).

b. He foresees what will be thought of his dissent, mentions his *insita cunctatio*, which young men call *metus* and *pigritia*; he will be suspected of *obtrectatio* and *invidia*; his achievements and advanced age should absolve him of that charge (Scipio is younger than Fabius' son). As dictator he demonstrated in the face of popular disfavor that his course was better (*usu meliora*). He has no desire for further glory, and is not trying to get the command for himself (40.6–14).

c. He cares more for the state than for good repute among men, and prefers the state's welfare to Scipio's glory (Scipio first named here) (41.1).

Nicias and Fabius begin by claiming that there is plenty of room left for deliberation upon a "settled" issue. At Athens the people had already voted; at Rome it was expected that Scipio would bring his question to the people if the senate were uncooperative. Each older man begins with himself, his martial accomplishments, and a defense of his preference for caution (πρόνοια [ὅς ἂν . . . προνοήται] and *cunctatio*). Nicias, already chosen as one of the generals, speaks of himself with modest brevity, and does not yet indicate disapproval of his colleague. Fabius, however, addresses the unspoken charge of envy with a lengthy justification based

²² But observe the notice at 28.38.12; Scipio already had Sicily as his province: see the remarks of Hoffmann (above, note 12) 89–90.

upon his record; his days as a commander are over and it is time for younger men to finish what he made possible. Livy has good reason to expand this portion of Fabius' speech: he contrasts the two men most responsible for winning the war, and reminds the reader of Fabius' worth at the moment when the great man was urging the senate not to adopt what proved to be the right course.²³ Although Fabius can admit that it is time for the younger generation to act, he cannot accept the idea that new methods are as necessary as new leaders.

Nicias and Fabius continue with a disclaimer: neither cares more for what people think than for the state's welfare. Nicias must deal with the Athenians, who are always ready to risk what they have for the sake of acquiring more,²⁴ and although he despairs of changing their character, he plans to argue on the issues of timing and difficulty. Fabius addresses Scipio, whose desire for glory will deprive him of the acclaim for defeating Hannibal in Italy, a thing which Fabius believes is not only possible but glorious enough in itself. As the historical circumstances differ, so do characterizations of what their opponents want. As the opposing speeches open, so do they close: Livy begins and ends with Scipio, Thucydides, despite the attention given to Alcibiades, with the Athenians. See the remarks, below, on the final portions of Alcibiades' argument.

B. *Vtile*²⁵

1. *Tutum (Intutum)*

NICIAS

a. Athenians may not be able to be persuaded to protect what they have (τὰ ὑπάρχοντα σώζειν) and not to run risks for phantoms (ἀφανὰ καὶ μέλλοντα) (9.3).

b. There are many enemies still at home and the expedition will turn nominal friends to enemies (10.1–3). Their enemies are waiting for their power to be divided (10.4). Secure the city first by securing the Chalcidice and other "allies" before going after more (10.5). Second speech: expense in men, ships, supplies (19.2; 21.1–23.1).

FABIUS

a. Hannibal and the war are in Italy (H. is a worthy opponent) (41.2–7). Let there be peace in Italy before there is war in Africa ("hoc et natura prius est, tua cum defenderis, aliena ire oppugnatum . . . et nobis prius cedat timor quam ultro aliis inferatur") (41.8–10).

b. The treasury cannot bear the expense in men, ships, supplies (41.11–12). There will be danger to Rome with half the army gone (41.13). [Carthage will send reinforcements (42.12–13).]

²³ See Ullmann (above, note 13) 119–20; Hoffmann (above, note 12) 93.

²⁴ Cf. Thucydides 1.70.3 (Corinthians), 1.144.1 (Pericles).

²⁵ See Quintilian 3.8.22–27 on *utile*, which he believes comprises many false categories, e.g. *necessarium*, *facile*.

c. It is easier to retain their hold on nearer peoples; Sicily is too far and cannot be controlled even if won; they should not fear its unity under Syracuse (11.1–3). Example of Sparta's reputation and its unexpected destruction may be turned on Athens (11.4–6).

c. Reminder of fate of Scipio's father and uncle (41.14–15). Examples of temerity gone bad on foreign expeditions (41.16). Athens and the Sicilian expedition: "Athenienses, prudentissima civitas, bello domi relicto, auctore aequae impigro ac nobili iuvene magna classe in Siciliam tramissa, una pugna navali florentem rem publicam suam in perpetuum adflixerunt" (41.17).

The arguments advanced at the beginning of this section are reiterated in both speeches just before the conclusions. Nicias' task is the more difficult, as the Athenians were acknowledged both as supreme at sea and victors in the Archidamian War, although the terms agreed to in 421 were not all fulfilled, and the loss of Amphipolis especially plagued them for many years to come. Still, it is more difficult to urge the successful to a cautious course. Fabius' position is more sympathetic and his plan for the continuation and completion of the war appears more reasonable when it is premised upon a series of Roman disasters and more recent successes which have not yet rid Italy of her tormentor.

Nicias and Fabius argue that to divide their forces is to ask for trouble from adversaries closer to home. Fabius repeats the threat later, just before his peroration. Nicias foresees a rupture of the peace, not even signed by all of their enemies, which the Lacedaemonians have accepted only because of a temporary embarrassment, and will disregard at the first favorable opportunity. In his second speech he tries to frighten the Athenians by exaggerating the necessary expenses. Fabius denies that the treasury can support two armies and fears another march on Rome if Scipio takes half of their forces to Africa. Each worries about the effect at home of failure abroad and cites an example of a reversal of fortune. Nicias argues that the Lacedaemonians appeared more terrifying before the Athenians had so much experience of them; he believes 1) that by analogy the Athenians should let the Sicilians see as little of them as possible and 2) that one should not base one's policy on the enemy's misfortunes. Fabius reminds Scipio that *in Africa quoque Mars communis belli erit* (28.41.14), and of how greatly the Roman situation in Spain changed during the course of one month; he recalls the catastrophe suffered by the Athenians, and deliberately compares Scipio to Alcibiades. It is interesting that the Roman historian has his characters represent Nicias' argument (and Thucydides' at 5.26) as if it were historical reality (*bello domi relicto* [28.41.17] / *omisso domi bello* [28.43.20]); Athens was not fighting a defensive war.

2. *Facile (Difficile)*

NICIAS

- a. From second speech: Difficulties of invading Sicily (20.3–21.2).
- b. Don't trust barbarians (Egestaeans) (9.1, 11.7; the people of Leontini are called exiles at 12.1).
- c. [Cf. above: don't fear united Sicily if Athenians stay away (11.2–5).] Second speech: Greek cities in Sicily don't want Athenian hegemony (20.2); they will need an immediate victory or Sicily will unite against them (23.2).

FABIUS

- a. Regulus (42.1). Difference between Spanish and African campaigns; difficulties of invading Africa (42.2–7).
- b. Don't trust barbarians (42.7–9).
- c. Africa, including Syphax and Masinissa, will unite (under Carthage) if the Romans come, and Carthage will fight better for its own territory than it did in Spain (42.9–11).

In his first speech, Nicias ignores specific logistic difficulties, but characterizes the idea as madness (*ἀνόητον*, 6.11.1). He speaks again later and tries to frighten the Athenians by rehearsing the obstacles which they face: a virtual lack of allies on the island, their opponents' strength in manpower and financial resources ready to hand in their home territory. Fabius argues similarly by contrasting the many advantages of operating in Spain (and incidentally diminishes the magnitude of Scipio's achievements there). Neither man thinks it is wise to trust anything to (or about) the barbarians who would be their allies, and Fabius believes (as Nicias does in his second speech) that the invasion will have an effect opposite to what was intended: a common threat will create a common cause for the people in whose territory they will find themselves, and the side in whose land the conflict takes place is supposed to have the advantage not only in resources but in will.

3. *Tutum*

NICIAS

Athens is just recovering from plague and war; they should consolidate their gains and not waste energy on exiles (*καὶ ταῦτα ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν δίκαιον ἐνθάδε εἶναι ἀναλοῦν*) (12.1).

FABIUS

Scipio let Hasdrubal get to Italy from Spain; it is safer to fight in Italy with united strength ("quo melior fortiorque es, eo magis talem praesidem sibi patria atque universa Italia retinet"); examples (42.12–20).

Save for the general intent, the two speeches have little in common in this section, where the arguments are based upon fact and circumstance and the speakers' interpretations thereof. Nicias injects an unkind (if true) analysis of the Leontinians' motives and worth. Fabius has nothing to correspond to this, as no one has called upon the Romans for help in Africa. In fact, he transforms the native kings from treacherous barbarians (if viewed as potential allies of the Romans) to loyal

supporters of Carthage. Nicias ends his argument with the advice that it is better to spend their recovering resources, which in some respects he minimizes,²⁶ securing the home front. In his much longer summation Fabius manages to make Hannibal appear both terrifying and, thanks to the Romans' united action, vulnerable. He dwells upon perilous episodes from the past to argue his belief that the Romans should use their gains to defeat Hannibal where he is. History has given Fabius much better material with which to frighten an audience; it is surprising that Nicias does not warn the Athenians of the consequences of the Lacedaemonian victory at Mantinea, although Athens had strengthened its position in the Peloponnesus in the meantime.

C. Conclusio (ab adversariis)

NICIAS

Attack on Alcibiades' youth and ambition, his desire for personal gain (τὸ ἐαυτοῦ μόνον σκοπῶν) (to support his extravagance); the affair is too great to trust to inexperienced judgment (12.2). Appeal to older and more sensible citizens (13.1–2). Asks for another vote (14). Thucydides adds remarks about Alcibiades (15.2–5). (Alcibiades wanted δόξη [15.2]; people's suspicion of tyrannical ambitions [15.5].)

FABIUS

Attack on Scipio's desire for glory; it is not *utile* to the republic but *amplum* and *gloriosum* for Scipio (reminder of recent escapade). Scipio was made consul for the state and *nos* (whoever we are), not for himself (*sibi ipsi privatim*). The army was enrolled to guard the city and Italy, *non quos regio more per superbiam consules, quo terrarum velint, traiciant* (42.20–22). Fabius' speech, *auctoritas*, reputation for *prudencia* convinced most of the senators, especially the *seniores*.

Nicias attacks Alcibiades, whom he does not name but describes exactly and accuses of urging the expedition for his own purposes, not the state's. His conclusion is much longer than Fabius' and embraces an exhortation to his audience not to be afraid to do the sensible thing, a statement of his *sententia*, and a request for a new vote.²⁷ Fabius' personal comments about Scipio are no less detailed and make the same charge that his opponent's personal ambition is a danger to national security, but he does not accuse his audience of cowardice. He states his *sententia*, which includes an accusation of regal behavior, if not ambition, absent from Nicias' remarks but not from Thucydides'.

Fabius' conclusion is remarkable for a speech on national policy, and unusual for an oration in Livy. When the policy and the nature of the adversary are closely connected (as when Cicero spoke against Catiline), one misses invective if it is not present. The more usual procedure is to

²⁶ See K. J. Dover ad loc., *HCT* 4.233–34.

²⁷ K. J. Dover, *HCT* 4.239–40 discusses the problem of putting the question again; there was nothing essentially illegal in so doing.

attack the opponent's plan or methods, not the opponent himself. Only one other example comes immediately to mind, and that not from Livy but from Cicero, who made the following claim (if one wishes to believe it) for the *First Philippic: de re publica graviter querens de homine nihil dixi* (*Phil.* 2.7). The words which Livy gives to Fabius here are owed to the model,²⁸ which contained not only the closing words of Nicias' first oration, but Thucydides' statements in his own voice.

II. SCIPIO AND ALCIBIADES. Livy, Book 28; Thucydides, Book 6.

A. Prooemium. Principium ab adversariis (et a nostra persona)

ALCIBIADES

a. He must speak of himself because he was attacked (16.1).

b. His expenses give credit to himself and to the state. The mighty always despise the lowly; the outstanding are always envied in life and beloved after death. This is what he wants and his desire has proved beneficial to the state (6.16.5: οἶδα δὲ τοὺς τοιούτους, καὶ ὅσοι ἐν τινος λαμπρότητι προέσχον, ἐν μὲν τῷ καθ' αὐτοὺς βίῳ λυπηροὺς ὄντας, τοῖς ὁμοίοις μὲν μάλιστα, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ξυνόντας, τῶν δὲ ἔπειτα ἀνθρώπων προσποιήσιν τε ξυγγενείας τισὶ καὶ μὴ οὔσαν καταλιπόντας, καὶ ἥς ἂν ὥσι πατρίδος, τάνητ' αὔχνησιν ὡς οὐ περὶ ἀλλοτρίων οὐδ' ἁμαρτόντων, ἀλλ' ὡς περὶ σφετέρων τε καὶ καλὰ πραξάντων) (16.2–6).

c. His past accomplishments, in his "youth" (16.6–17.1).

SCIPIO

a. Fabius has not entirely argued away the suspicion of *obtrectatio* (43.2–3).

b. Fabius' accusation pretended that Scipio might be emulated by any low person, and not by the great Fabius. Everyone longs for eternal memory ("longius, quam quantum vitae humanae spatium est, cupiditas gloriae extendatur maximaque pars eius in memoriam ac posteritatem promineat. . . . maximo cuique id accidere animo certum habeo, ut se non cum praesentibus modo, sed cum omnis aevi claris viris comparent"). He wants to outdo Fabius, and both Fabius and he would be unfair not only to the state but to the human race to envy a younger person who would surpass them (43.4–8).

c. His past accomplishments. "Am I younger now?" (43.9–16).

Alcibiades and Scipio both defend the traits for which they have been attacked, but these, although they have the same end, are quite different. Scipio's extravagance has not yet been questioned (it will be). Alcibiades regards his habit of expensive display as a credit to the state which creates an impression of a healthier economy. Scipio comes immediately to the point: he sees no reason not to reach for undying fame. The theme of an eternal reputation is present in both speeches, but the Greek and the Roman discuss the matter in ways suited to their individual and national characters. Scipio's aims are internalized; he speaks frankly of his desire to emulate and surpass the greatest men of history.

²⁸ I owe this observation on the ending of Fabius' oration to an anonymous reader.

Alcibiades dwells upon the external, the reaction of others to a man whose abilities and accomplishments are exceptional. He emphasizes the pride of outstanding men, their refusal to recognize their humbler fellows, inevitable and natural envy (especially of their peers), and posthumous admiration extending far beyond national boundaries. Scipio mentions the lowly (“*tamquam mihi ab infimo quoque periculum sit ne mecum aemuletur*”) and observes both that the greater part of one’s fame extends beyond one’s lifetime and that the whole world is affected by remarkable people, but he stresses the rivalry between great men with others of their calibre, both living and dead, and rejects envy as an unsuitable emotion.

Both arguments employ ironical allusions to the speakers’ youth. Alcibiades notes that the Peloponnesian alliance was his doing, that he forced the Lacedaemonians to stake everything at Mantinea, that although they won they have not recovered their position (see Thucydides 5.75.3 for a different assessment). These are the accomplishments of his youth and “recklessness” (*ἀνοια παρὰ φύσιν δοκοῦσα εἶναι*). Since he is older now (and Nicias is lucky) the Athenians should employ both their services. Alcibiades’ abilities, as he describes them, are political and oratorical, his accomplishments not yet many. The corresponding section of Scipio’s speech is much longer; his achievements are military and substantial; he makes the most of them in a series of rhetorical questions,²⁹ the point of which is to indicate that if he accomplished so much under such unfavorable conditions when he received a command at the age of twenty-four, the outlook now can be no less bright.

B. Vtile

1. *Facile*

ALCIBIADES

- a. It will be easy to take Sicily; disunity and fickleness of the Sicilians (17.2–6).
- b. Their ancestors left the same enemies behind when they fought Persia and won an empire; proof of the value of the fleet (17.7–8).

SCIPIO

- a. It will be easy to take Carthage; faithlessness and fickleness of their allies (44.4–5).
- b. Sets the record straight on Regulus and counters Fabius’ examples from antiquity with some of his own (“*at etiam Athenienses audiendi sunt, temere in Siciliam omissio domi bello transgressi,*” 43.20); the value of the Roman army (43.17–44.3).

Alcibiades and Scipio both maintain that the enemy’s reliance upon untrustworthy peoples makes their weakness obvious. But the order of

²⁹ Cf. Botha (above, note 17) 76. His questions are reinforced by multiple anaphora (*cum* [5]—*nemo* [2]—*cum*; *utrum*—*an* [3]; *post* [3]—*tot* [2]—*post*), answering Fabius’ questions with anaphora (*quid?* [3]) at 28.41.12–14.

argument is reversed in the two speeches, because Scipio's exempla interrupt his rebuttal of Fabius' contention that an invasion of Africa will be difficult; he answers the comparison (which he characterizes as a *fabula Graeca*) with the Sicilian expedition, and of himself to Alcibiades, by comparing himself instead to Agathocles. Scipio takes time to answer Fabius' exempla and to add new ones, including the unexpected success of Hannibal himself. He argues that the Carthaginian experience with Agathocles and in the first Punic war proves that an invasion of Africa is feasible and will draw the enemy away from the offensive. Alcibiades' claim is similar: during the Persian war the Athenians left their country, and their Greek enemies, behind and sailed out to win not only a victory but an empire. For the Athenians, the navy was the crucial factor leading to success against overwhelming odds;³⁰ for the Romans, it was the soldier: οὐκ ἄλλω τινὶ ἢ τῇ περιουσίᾳ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ ἰσχύοντες (6.17.7) / "nos, etiam deserti ab sociis, viribus nostris, milite Romano stetimus" (28.44.5). Here their rationales had to be different: reality was.

2. (*Vtile per se*)

ALCIBIADES

- a. Duty to allies, keeping oath; alliances are made not to get help for Athens at home but to harm her enemies where they are; how to get empire; it is more intelligent to prevent an attack than to repel one (18.1–3).
- b. The expedition will prove that they despise the Peloponnesians; they will conquer or hurt Syracuse, which will be an advantage to their allies and to themselves; their navy guarantees safety both for the expedition and at Athens (18.4–5).

SCIPIO

- a. Promise of success in Africa (44.6). *Spes* dependent upon *fortuna p. R.*, *di foederis ab hoste violati testes*, and the African kings; duty means not to fail fortune by talking away an opportunity (44.7–8).
- b. He will draw Hannibal back to Africa to fight for Carthage. Promise of safety in Italy (Fabius insults Licinius, the other consul, when he fears for Italy, when Fabius himself held off a stronger Hannibal with fewer resources) (44.9–11).

Alcibiades speaks realistically of the strategic advantages of their alliances, which include the aim of harming one's enemies, even when unprovoked, and an assessment of what one must do to gain and keep an empire. As an exercise in speaking the truth it is like Pericles' advice many years earlier.³¹ Advantage is the key to his final arguments; *honestum* is a minor element. He begins to describe what honorable treatment of allies is (οἷς χρεών, ἐπειδὴ γε καὶ ξυνωμόσασμεν, ἐπαμύνειν, καὶ μὴ ἀντιτιθέναι ὅτι οὐδὲ ἐκείνοι ἡμῖν, 6.18.1), but his reasons are self- (or state-) serving. He denies that τὸ ἡσυχον is an ideal worth

³⁰ Cf. Pericles at Thucydides 1.142.3–143.5.

³¹ This is more forthright than the Athenian(s) at Lacedaemon at 1.75.1–76.2. Cf. Pericles at 2.41.4, 63.1–3.

considering; one must constantly be on the offensive in order not to lose ground. Between his arguments of expediency and safety there is a short section on the psychological effect which the expedition will have upon the Peloponnesians, but this is a minor theme. While Alcibiades prefers in general to create opportunities, on this occasion one has presented itself. Scipio also speaks of seizing the chance which is offered. He relies on his own ability to take advantage of any situation which will arise (and his faith in the native kings is not blind, 28.44.7). Although Alcibiades qualifies his appraisal of the substantive results of their projected invasion, Scipio says that the Romans will win because everything that is right and holy is on their side. This appeal to righteousness is in direct contrast with Alcibiades' argument from expediency. Danger or failure in Africa do not occur to Scipio, but he answers Fabius' fears for Italy by saying that he should have a higher opinion of Crassus than to insult him. Alcibiades assures the Athenians that their navy will keep Athens safe no matter what happens in Sicily. The basic elements of both arguments are similar: take the chance offered, the expedition will be a success, the homeland will not be endangered by it. But circumstance and personality combine to produce very different descriptions of what is useful and why. Scipio wants to win a war; Alcibiades wants to maintain and enlarge an empire.

C. Honestum

ALCIBIADES

It is not right to set the old against the young; remember the Persian war; strength in unity; use it or lose it (18.6).

SCIPIO

Even if his plan does not end the war more quickly, Roman dignity demands retaliation and proof of their spirit. Remember the first Punic war; it is Africa's turn to suffer (44.12-15).

These portions of the two speeches correspond to nothing in the arguments of their adversaries,³² for whom what is honorable is unworthy of consideration compared to what they perceive as sensible. Each speaker recalls his nation's attitude in the last great conflict, and urges his audience to recapture the spirit of that time. But the spirit evoked and its desired effect upon the immediate future is not the same in each case. When Alcibiades asks Nicias not to stir up intergenerational strife, he has his finest moment of the speech: recollection of the Persian war can elevate even his thoughts for a time, and he pleads for unity among all the elements of the citizenry.³³ He also prefers deeds to words in the context of his argument from nature: things in general, people, and

³² See the remarks of Ullmann (above, note 13) 121 on the absence of this element of *honestum* in Fabius' speech.

³³ Cf. Pericles at Thucydides 1.144.4.

national spirits are best off when they are exercised according to their own character. This is praise of Athens in line with the best things conceded by the Corinthians,³⁴ an argument which serves its author's purpose in the context, but when viewed alone seems divorced from Alcibiades' immediate intent. As a description of Athenians past, present, and future it restates a premise which informs Thucydides' history of the war. In the last section, Alcibiades urged the sailing on psychological grounds (ποιώμεθα τὸν πλοῦν, ἵνα Πελοποννησίων τε στορέσωμεν τὸ φρόνημα, 6.18.4). Similarly, but from a different vantage point, Scipio reminds the Romans that their international image is at stake if they cannot live up to Hannibal's daring nor to their own in the first Punic war. Revenge is an additional motive: the Romans have not got much spirit if they do not make the Carthaginians suffer some of what they have endured for the past fourteen years. The discussions of honorable behavior reveal better than anything else the unlikeness of the men and their situations, and the historians' manipulation of both. What should animate Rome is what already animates Scipio. Alcibiades, on the other hand, is no longer important by the end of his speech. His own persona fades into the historian's; the focus shifts to his countrymen.

D. Conclusio

ALCIBIADES

The nation should be true to its own active nature (18.7).

SCIPIO

Refusal to attack Fabius (whom he can defeat in modesty) (44.16–18).

Both men end with a look at national policy, although Scipio feels the need to reiterate nothing ("quae ad rem publicam pertinent et bellum, quod instat, et provincias, de quibus agitur, dixisse satis est," 28.44.16) and he ends with a *praeteritio*. He distinguishes the younger from the older generation (an echo of Alcibiades' plea, above)³⁵ when he refuses to attack his opponent or belittle his achievements, especially since deeds prove more than words. His final remarks are about himself. Alcibiades' conclusion proceeds naturally from his previous argument wherein he deplored the opposition of older and younger men and urged the Athenians to continued united action. His advice on the best way to run a state is evidence of his stance in the real world and of ideas which indicate what is advantageous, but he says nothing here of himself. It is the Athenians who will be persuaded to sail against Sicily because the Athenians in Thucydides love to attempt the outrageous. At this point in the war with Hannibal, though, Livy's Scipio is the

³⁴ Thucydides 1.70.2–9.

³⁵ Within a larger framework, M. Bonnefond, *MEFR* 94:1 (1982) 200–217 has an interesting discussion of the similarity in the arguments between Fabius and Scipio, Nicias and Alcibiades, for their evidence about the conflict between generations.

driving force who will move the Romans, despite opposition, to a great adventure.³⁶

The reactions to these speeches differed greatly for Thucydides and Livy, Athens and Rome. Thucydides says that Nicias made a second speech to try to dampen his countrymen's enthusiasm by making outrageous demands; his forethought only made the enthusiastic feel safer (6.19.1–24.4). The unhappy few were afraid to oppose the majority, who were influenced by various motives, including greed (6.24.4). Scipio was received less favorably because he addressed the senate and because of rumors about his plan to appeal to the people, and a discussion of his intentions followed his oration (28.45.1–9), but in the end he got what he needed.

When dealing with investigated or reported events, the historian must set down his information, and so after the speeches the two accounts diverge where they must: relating what happened. But Livy omits no similarity in the effect of the subsequent crises and their resolution (Livy 29.16.4–22.3; Thucydides 6.27.1–29.3): the impiety bodes ill for new endeavors, Alcibiades and Scipio are both implicated in the unhappy events and in their absence their personal rivals make the most of an opportunity to discredit them and remove them from command, with prejudice against their personal habits a telling force for the opposition. The event, however, proved all analogy false: Alcibiades demanded an investigation, despite the delay, but could not get one; Scipio had more reasonable friends and enemies, and the former prevailed, even though Metellus' advice was to bring Scipio back even from Africa if he could not exonerate himself. The man of deeds did just that (29.22.1: *Scipio res non verba ad purgandum sese paravit*).

III. THE SAILING. Livy, Book 29; Thucydides, Book 6.

THUCYDIDES

Fleet ready for departure. Excitement, hopes and fears; citizens and foreigners see them off (30.1–31.1).

Comparison with previous departures (31.2–3).

Elaborate equipment, expense, magnificence; daring (31.3–6); *ἐπίδειξιν μάλλον εἰκασθῆναι τῆς δυνάμεως καὶ ἐξουσίας ἢ ἐπὶ πολεμίους παρασκευῇν* (31.4).

Prayers and departure (32.1–2).

LIVY

Excitement and expectations (24.10–14): *ut non ad bellum duci viderentur, sed ad certa victoriae praemia* (24.11).

Numbers of men (25.1–4); arrangements (25.5–13).

Comparison with previous departures (26.1–6).

Everyone comes to see them set off (26.7–8).

Prayers and departure (27.1–6).

³⁶ Scipio is called *fatalis dux huiusce belli* (22.53.6); there are many passages in the second half of the decade on Scipio's ambition and people's expectations of it, e.g. 28.17.2–3, 40.1–2; 29.10.7, 20.2, 22.6.

Livy describes the departure of the Romans from Sicily in a way reminiscent of Thucydides' depiction of the Sicilian Expedition at its outset. Common elements include the expectation and excitement aroused by the endeavors, the crowds of people who come to watch the fleets sail, and the prayers before setting off. Other factors are similarly related but with a different emphasis in each case: the details about the arrangements and equipment, the statements that the expeditions appear to have little to do with actual warfare, and the comparisons with earlier naval operations which were comparable in size but not in scope or effect. Livy's evocation of Thucydides reveals essential contrasts when he uses the same topics but treats several of them differently. The Romans' preparations are businesslike, the Athenians' are ostentatious. The Romans appear to be sailing to a victory, the Athenians to make a display. The differences are marked especially at the points where each historian explains what made the present expedition special:

Multae classes Romanae e Sicilia atque ipso illo portu profectae erant; ceterum non eo bello solum . . . sed ne priore quidem ulla profectio tanti spectaculi fuit; quamquam, si magnitudine classes aestimares . . . (Livy 29.26.1–2).

παρασκευὴ γὰρ αὕτη πρώτη ἐκπλεύσασα μᾶς πόλεως δυνάμει Ἑλληνικῇ πολυτελεστάτῃ δὴ καὶ εὐπρεπεστάτῃ τῶν ἐς ἐκείνον τὸν χρόνον ἐγένετο. ἀριθμῶ δὲ νεῶν καὶ ὀπλιτῶν . . . (Thucydides 6.31.1–2).

Each author gives three reasons for the greatness of the endeavor compared to earlier naval operations. The first two do not correspond. 1) Thucydides says that other fleets had been dispatched only for a short time and with lesser equipment. This statement leads to a long description of preparations, expense, and rivalry among men to equip their vessels and themselves as splendidly as they could (6.31.3–5). Livy's first reason is that the second Punic war was much more terrible for the Romans because it was fought in Italy and marked by great disasters (29.26.4). The Athenians were doing something bigger and better, the Romans were finally mounting a big offensive. 2) Thucydides' second reason sums up his account of the preparations—daring, magnificence, and excess: *τόλμης τε θάμβει καὶ ὄψεως λαμπρότητι περιβόητος ἐγένετο* (6.31.6): not a bad description of Alcibiades, but it is the expedition itself which he characterizes in this way. Livy names Scipio himself, his *facta* and *fortuna* which attracted attention (29.26.5). 3) Finally, the Athenians were sending out their greatest expedition with their greatest expectations (6.31.6), and so were the Romans, although Livy does not put it that way: this was the first time that any Roman leader in the war had had the idea, and that leader promised success (29.26.6). Livy presents a contrast between the Romans' fortunes in the first part of the war—and Scipio. Thucydides writes of the Athenians.

Livy continues to draw the same contrast, but brings in Scipio as the focus and motivating force of the Romans' victory. He has done the same thing here as in Scipio's speech, which diverges more in particulars from Alcibiades' as it progresses. Thucydides let Alcibiades fade from prominence before the end of his speech, which shifts attention to the Athenians, and that is where the historian's attention stays through his narrative of the departure. Livy makes Scipio himself an increasingly more prominent topic as his speech progresses, and maintains the same emphasis in this passage. Fabius has rightly been recognized as a Nicias figure even in other portions of Livy's work,³⁷ but despite Fabius' comparison, it would be impossible for the Romans' angel of victory to resemble the Athenians' evil angel in anything more than his splendor. Scipio could not be an Alcibiades.

A third opinion must be added to Thucydides' (1.22.4) and Fabius' (Livy 28.41.13, cited above): Livy's. "Hoc illud est praecipue in cognitione rerum salubre ac frugiferum, omnis te exempli documenta in illustri posita monumento intueri; inde tibi tuaeque rei publicae quod imitere capias, inde foedum inceptu, foedum exitu, quod vites" (*Praef.* 10). But even Thucydides may modify himself (3.82.2). Livy has followed Thucydides up to a point; the coincidences demand such a comparison. Livy's aims were as different from Thucydides' as the outcomes of the great expeditions, and within the framework of a long literary allusion Livy has introduced essential changes to fit not only the facts but his interpretation of them. A close look at the texts, especially of the adversaries' speeches, shows that Livy has borrowed Thucydides' building blocks and with them he has built an almost identical structure, but he has painted it with different colors.³⁸

³⁷ Cf. Walsh, cited above, note 8.

³⁸ I would like to thank Professor Erich Gruen, who took the time to read an earlier version of this paper, and whose suggestions have prompted me to write a more careful argument in many places. I am grateful as well for the advice of an anonymous reader, which led me to read through Livy again. Infelicities and logical lapses which may remain are my own.